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Abstrat
Norms, dened as generally aepted behaviour in soieties without entral au-
thority (and thus distinguished from laws), are very powerful mehanism leading
to oherent behaviour of the soiety members. This paper examines, within a
simple numerial simulation, the various eets that may lead to norm forma-
tion and stability. The approah has been rst used by Axelrod, who proposed
two step model of norm and meta-norm enforement. We present here an ex-
tension and detailed analysis of the original work, as well as several new ideas
that may bear on the norm establishment mehanisms in soieties. It turns out
that a relatively simple model for simulated norm enforement predits persis-
tent norm breaking even when it is assoiated with high punishment levels. The
key fators appear to be the ombination of the level of penalty for breaking
the norm and proximity of norm enforers. We also study a totally dierent
mehanism of norm establishment, without meta-norms but using instead the
diret bonus mehanism to norm-enforers.
1 Denitions of the Norms Game variants
The original work of Axelrod [1℄, later reprinted and expanded, as Chapter 3
of [2℄ has desribed a possible senario for modelling norm formation, alled
the Norms Game (NG), and its higher level variant, the Meta Norms Game
(MNG). The games are based on extended Prisoner's Dilemma game, inluding
additional ation by the rest of ommunity: punishment of a defetor (NG),
and additional possibility of punishment of for failing to punish the defetor
(MNG). The idea behind the model is to see if suh enforement may lead to
formation of stable ooperative soiety, and whether simple enforement has to
be augmented by meta-enforement, to ahieve stability of the system.
1.1 The lassi formulation of Norms Game.
The model presented by Axelrod is based on an N -person PD game. Within the
game, eah player i has several "ation opportunities" eah turn, during whih
he an either play safe, in whih ase he gets no benet, or defet in whih
ase he gets a treasure of T > 0, while players j 6= i get extra harm H < 0.
The willingness of an agent i to ommit a defetion is alled boldness bi. For
obvious reasons, the only stable strategy in suh game is that of total defetion
 eah "safe player" is at distint disadvantage with the defetors.
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The next step is the introdution of norm enforement ativities (the
norm being understood as the neutral, safe behaviour).
If the player i does not defet, other players do not take ation. If, on
the other hand, i does break the norm, other players j may, with probability
vj (vengefulness), punish him for misbehaviour. In the original treatment,
the punishment value P was assumed greater than the treasure T . At the
same time, eah punishing agent pays punishment osts E (enforement).
The punishment for defetion onstitutes the proper Norms Game: soiety uses
ative measures to enfore the norms.
After eah round of interations between agents, Axelrod used simple popu-
lation adjustment, giving higher population ratios to those players with higher
overall benets. He has also used a small "mutation" rate to introdue small
random shifts in strategies. Results of simulations were presented after 100 gen-
erations. In Axelrod's simulations two out of ve runs ended up in boldness
b ≈ 1 and v ≈ 0, while other simulations ended with various levels of vengeful-
ness, with very small boldness. The pure norm enforing behaviour, depending
on the simulation history or initial onditions led to either almost fully defeting
soiety or to one paied by vengefulness. Axelrod's argument was that pure
NG is too weak to ensure norm respeting behaviour.
Introduing Meta Norms Game, as an extension of the previous model, Ax-
elrod proposed that if agent i defets and agent j does not punish i, then with
probability v′ any other agent k should punish j for failing to enfore the norm!
The meta-punishment P ′ and ost assoiated with it, E′ were assumed to be
equal to P and E.
More importantly, themeta-vengefulness v′ was assumed to be equal to v.
This deision was based on rather vague arguments. The link denitely simpli-
ed alulations, but, as noted by Axelrod himself, prohibited situations when
ertain agents would use dierent values of v and v′ to their advantage. Results
of simulations with v = v′ were uniform: in all ases the soiety onverged to
almost pure high vengefulness, low boldness, norm-observing one.
From his simulations Axelrod has onluded that, for pure Norms Game,
. . . at rst, boldness levels fell dramatially due to the vengefulness
in the population. Then, gradually, the amount of vengefulness also
fell beause there was no diret inentive to pay the enforement
ost of punishing the defetion. One vengefulness beame rare, the
average level of boldness rose again, and then the norm ompletely
ollapsed. Moreover, the ollapse was a stable outome.
In ontrast, the inlusion of meta-norm enforement had provided the agents
with a strong inentive to inrease their vengefulness and this to promote the
norm (derease boldness). This was indeed onrmed by the simulation results.
From one point of view this is obvious onsequene of the model, in whih
some harateristis are penalised (boldness in ase of NG, boldness and lak
of vengefulness in the ase of MNG). Lak meta-vengefulness is not penalised
at all, just the opposite  it arries its own ost, and is thus disadvantageous
evolutionarily. This leads to minimization of the meta-vengefulness in the evo-
lution proess  unless, as in Axelrod's model, it is foribly xed, for example by
oupling it to vengefulness. By setting v = v′, P = P ′ and E = E′ Axelrod has
not only simplied the simulations, but also made a sort of self-poliing model.
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He has thus exluded analysis treating meta-enforement and enforement as
independent yet interating phenomena.
Additionally, beause in the original form, the Norms Game was played
with a very small number of agents (20) no saling eets were visible. One of
suh eets is the umulation of penalties due to the model in whih anyone is
apable of punishing everyone, and individual punishments add up. This results
in penalties easily "overoming" benets of trespassing. Despite the mentioned
oversimpliations of the simulations themselves, the MNG model seems to be
interesting enough to use it as a basis for more detailed studies. A signiant
and open question remains whether the results would be hanged by larger and
longer simulations and by more exible model.
1.2 Modied form of Norms Game with single enforers
To extend the validity of the model and to hek if the assumptions made by
Axelrod ould be derived from more general priniples we propose a modied
form of MNG.
We assume that NT agents (NT ≫ 1) are onneted via a network of on-
netions, eah interating with a number of neighbors. In dierent simulations
we have used four basi network topologies, typial for biologial or soial net-
works. These types inluded: fully onneted network, in whih every agent
is onneted with all others; random network, where agents are onneted
by randomly distributed links; nearest neighbour network, where the links
are highly lustered and nally the small world networks. The three latter
types of networks may be alled loal, as the number of agents that a given
agent interats with (atively or passively) is muh smaller than the total num-
ber of agents. This limits the inuene and sets stage for possible indiret
inuenes. General desription of suh networks may be found in Albert and
Barabási [3℄, Dorogovtsev and Mendes [5℄, Dorogovtsev et al. [6℄, Dorogovtsev
and Mendes [4℄, Newman [7, 8℄, Newman and Park [9℄. All these networks are
haraterized by lling ratio, whih relates to the average number of links per
node (agent). The larger the lling ratio, the more agents are diretly onneted.
In our simulations we have used ratios from 0.005 to 0.02 (whih orresponds to
ira 5 to 20 links per agent. The dierene between the various types of loal
networks are in the way the agents are onneted.
In random (RAND) networks the links are distributed randomly, thus we
have a meshed network of links, with agents diering in number of the neigh-
bours, and no general struture.
The nearest neighbor (NN) nets are formed by linking ertain number of
losest neighbors together. The easiest way to visualize suh network is to plae
the agents on an imaginary irle and onneting eah agent to n neighbors.
The number of onnetions per agent is onstant. Interesting property of NN
networks is that for small lling fators, agents on the opposite points at the
irle to ommuniate must go through many intermediaries. For 2000 agents
and number of neighbors set at 10, the longest `distane' is 100 `hops'. This
suggests inuene on the hanges in norm adherene and enforement: any
hange of behavior of the agent i is seen immediately by his losest neighbors
(who an see him through diret links) but only after onsiderable delay and
ltering by members of soiety loated far from i.
The Small World (SW) networks, introdued and popularized in reent years,
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reprodue a urious fat observed in many natural and human-produed net-
works, namely that the distane between any two nodes of the network, mea-
sured in links needed to onnet them, is usually muh smaller than that in
nearest neighbor or even random networks of the same lling ratio. The name
of the network ategory omes exatly from suh observation. One of the models
for SW networks is a simple reworking of the NN model: one takes a small (even
very small!) fration of the links from between nearest neighbors and applies
them instead between random agents. Keeping in mind the visualization of NN
networks as nodes along a irle, this orresponds to adding onnetions that
riss-ross the irle at random. Due to suh shortuts, even if their number
is very small, the average distane between any two nodes drops dramatially.
Thus we have a network that for eah agent, loally is very similar to NN model
(as most of the neighbors are, in fat, the same), but globally the ommuniation
through the network is muh faster.
Within our MNG senario eah agent has a hoie between ating in aor-
dane with a norm, in whih ase he gets no extra bonus, or breaking the norm
(trespassing), in whih ase he gets extra bonus (treasure) T . If the agent i
misbehaves, every agent in the population is harmed by this ation. We an
imagine this orresponds, for example, to the agent stealing some `ommunal
property'. The treasure T is the benet to the trespasser, but the harm H to
the ommunity may be greater than T . It is then assumed that the harm H is
divided evenly among population, eah agent `losing' H/NT .
Let's denote the probability of misbehavior (boldness) of agent i by bi. The
payo X(i) of agent i is (without any punishments) given by
X(i) = biT −NT 〈b〉TH/NT = biT −H〈b〉T (1)
where 〈b〉T denotes average of bi over the total population. With H > T the
overall average payo beomes negative 〈b〉T (T −H) and is disadvantageous to
the ommunity, but as any agent with boldness higher than the average gets
more benet than the rest, suh behaviour gives evolutionary advantage, and
thus multiplies. Natural end of suh a proess is a free-for-all, bi = 1 soiety.
As in Axelrod's work we propose that to urb boldness, soiety enfores the
norm through penalization of trespassing. Our model diers slightly in the way
the proess of detetion and punishment is enoded.
Eah agent wathes his neighbours for ats of misbehavior and is may be
willing to punish for suh ats. For an agent j with vengefulness vj the prob-
ability of detetion that another agent i has broken the norm is just vj . The
wathfulness and vengefulness result in enforement eort E, the overall ost of
being vigilant to an agent j being vjE. The rst agent to notie that someone
has broken the norm punishes the transgressor with a punishment of P . Thus
only one punishment at take plae and there is no umulation eets, but the
value of P may be set freely. To alulate the expeted penalty value we start
with the probability of no-one deteting the misbehaviour of i is∏
(j 6=i)
(1− vj), (2)
where the produt is taken over all agents j with links to i, that is over the
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neighbours of i. As a result the penalty for agent i would be given by
piP (i) =

1− ∏
(j 6=i)
(1 − vj)

 biP, (3)
that is proportional to probability is at least one agent deteting the at of
breaking the norm times probability of suh at times the penalty value. With-
out meta-norms the payo for player i is thus
biT −H〈b〉T − viE −

1− ∏
(j 6=i)
(1− vj)

 biP (4)
So far the dierene between the modied model and Axelrod's one was in
the fat that the punishment takes plae only one. The real hange omes in
the way the meta-norm is introdued. In the original model every failure to
punish a norm breaker was meta-punished. Here, we have only one punishing
agent (the rst one to detet the trespasser). The problem is how should the
meta-enforer deide whether non-punishment by ertain agent was intentional
(due to lak of vengefulness or it's small value) or just a result of oming in
seond, after the enforement has already taken plae? One way is to set the
probability of meta-punishment as being proportional to the lak of vengefulness
of the observed agent:
XMP (j, i) = v
′
j(1− vi), (5)
with v′j being the meta-vengefulness of the observing agent j and 1 − vi being
the lak of vengefulness of the observed agent i. Thus the expeted value of
meta-punishment for an agent i is
piMP (i) =

1− ∏
(j 6=i)
(1−XMP (j, i))

P ′ (6)
As our simulations were oneived as extension of the work of Axelrod, we
have used similar onvention of allowing disretized values of bi, vi and v
′
i (from
0 to 1 with steps of 0.1). To see if suh disretization does not produe any
artiial eets we have also performed alulations in whih boldness, venge-
fulness and meta-vengefulness were allowed to take arbitrary values between 0
and 1. To our slight surprise the results did not dier signiantly. The spei
results presented in this paper refer to the disrete model.
1.2.1 Results of NG and MNG for large fully onneted networks
Lets turn now to the NG and MNG played in relatively large, fully onneted
networks. Here every agent interats with all agents as in the ase of the small
model of Axelrod, and the evolution seems rather simple. The most important
fat here is that even a single enforer or meta-enforer (say an aidental mu-
tant) would be able to inuene the payos of all agents, and diret the ourse
of evolution of population.
Lets onsider rst the situation where there is no meta-norm enforement at
all (P ′ = 0). If one starts from a random population in all simulations the nal
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average value of vengefulness was v = 0. This is due to additional osts borne by
the enforers, and the pressure to minimize this ost. However, as initially there
were some norm enforers (and remember that in a fully onneted network just
one mutant would sue to enfore the norm on the whole population!) the
enforement put a lear divide between two basi situations. When the treasure
T is greater than P it pays to be bold, and b→ 1. On the ontrary, for T < P
we have b → 0. This orresponds to ommon sense observation that the norm
would be obeyed if the penalty for breaking it would be sure (whih is made
probable by large number of observers) and greater than the benets.
When the meta-norm enforement is present the situation shifts to meta-
level. In all simulations the nal average value of meta-vengefulness goes to zero
(v′ → 0)  due to the same arguments as vengefulness dropped in previously
desribed simulation. However, as already noted, in a fully onneted network
even a single meta-enforer is able to meta-punish everyone in soiety! Thus,
although nominally the number of these meta-enforers goes is zero in the stable
situation, their initial inuene and oasional mutant presene are suient to
distinguish the situation from the previously desribed ase of P ′ = 0.
The results of simulations dier in small details (suh as the number of
iterations it takes to ahieve stability) but in priniple are governed by two
simple rules.
• The boldness is deided by relation of T vs. P , as desribed above
• The vengefulness is deided by relation of the ost of vengefulness E and
the meta-punishment P ′
Again, the above results are very muh ommon sense. Deoupling v from
v′ results in v′ → 0 for MNG, whih ontrasts the assumed v = v′ in Axelrod
approah. Large size of the population leads to elimination of `undeided' runs
 all simulations ended with uniform populations.
1.2.2 Loal networks
In ontrast to the fully onneted ase, the loal networks present muh more
interesting norms dependene on the payo parameters.
As in the original formulation of MNG, in addition to a breeding meha-
nism, in whih ertain perentage of agents with the best payos were allowed
to breed (at the ost of the worst faring agents), we have used additional mu-
tation proess. This was simulated as allowing ertain fration of agents (given
by mutation ratio) to hange their harateristi bi, vi and v
′
i values between
interations. Although the number of mutants per iteration was usually kept
very small in relation with the population size (e.g. 2 mutants out of 2000
per iteration), its eets were quite important. Without mutation populations
sometimes froze in a given onguration, `far' from results obtained with even
minimal mutation rates.
Another eet we set out to investigate was the dependene of the behaviour
on the starting onditions. Two general types of starting onditions were used:
in the rst the initial populations had randomly distributed values of bi, vi and
v′i. In the seond, we have started from pure soiety of, for example, bi = 0,
vi = 1 and v
′
i = 0, or bi = 1, vi = 1 and v
′
i = 0 to observe if suh pure soieties
were evolutionary stable with respet to small mutation rates. It turned out that
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regardless of the starting ondition, if the mutation was present, the nal state
was very similar.
We present general results of simulation runs through a few examples, and
disuss the role of the starting onditions. The simulations were run for 2000
agents using xed values of P = 20, P ′ = 3, E′ = 1, H = 12, with top 1% of
the population being allowed to reprodue eah iteration (at the expense of the
bottom 1%). Other parameters (T , E) were used to ontrol the simulations and
the dependene on them is presented and disussed below.
1.2.3 Similarities and dierenes between random, NN and SW net-
works
In our simulations we ompare results for all three types of loal networks.
Despite the fat that the three types of loally onneted networks have many
dierent properties (see, for example [3, 5, 6, 4℄) the results of our simulations
for random, small world and nearest neighbour networks are strikingly similar
(see Figure 1). It turns out that the key fator is the ommon harateristi of all
models, given in the rst approximation by the average number of neighbours.
The number of neighbors is related network lling fator φ, dened as ratio of
the atual links in the network to the total possible number of links:
φ =
NLINKS
NT (NT − 1)/2
. (7)
For regular networks, suh as NN network, the number of neighbors is the
same for all agents, NN = NLINKS = φNTOT /2. For small world networks,
onstruted as in this work, the NN dened above is a very lose measure of
the number of neighbors, with very few exeptions. For random networks, the
dispersion in number of links per agent is greater, but still NN gives the average
value.
The dierenes between loal network topologies for the same lling fator
values are relatively small. Thus the use of the word `loal' is justied: behaviour
of an agent is then determined by his immediate surrounding, mainly by the
number of agents who observe it and vie-versa, the number of agents it observes.
The two vertial olumns of plots in Figure 1 orrespond to two ases of E/P ′
ratio. The left olumn has E/P ′ = 2/3 < 1, whih in the ase of fully onneted
network would orrespond to large vengefulness v  so, to strong pressure to
derease b. The right olumn has E/P ′ = 5/3, with meta-penalty smaller
than the ost of being vigilant there is little inentive to be a norm enforer.
Indeed, the results of simulations for the two ases are strikingly dierent. For
E/P ′ < 1 v is relatively large and b resembles the step-like funtion found in
fully onneted network. v′ remains relatively small. On the other hand, for
E/P ′ > 1 v is smaller, v′ larger, and the step like harater of b is replaed
by gradual growth. This orresponds to the presene of trespassers who, in
loal environments, nd that loally the eetive punishment is smaller than
the treasure value. Thus even at T/P muh smaller than 1 we have relatively
high average b.
1.2.4 Disussion of the dependene on the lling fator
Figure 2 presents another set of omparisons of the average nal b, v and v′
values, this time for a single type of the network topology (Small World) but
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diering by the lling fator φ. The top row orresponds to φ = 0.005, middle
row to φ = 0.01, bottom row to φ = 0.02. Corresponding average number of
neighbours hanges from 5 to 20. For the ase of E/P ′ = 5/3 (right olumn)
the dierene is visible mostly in lowering values of v and v′ below T/P = 1,
and in more pronouned kink in b at T/P = 1 with inreasing φ.
For E/P ′ = 2/3 one an observe two eets:
• a shift of the step-like inrease of b as funtion of T/P to values lower
than 1;
• an inrease in vengefulness v in the region of T far below P for E = 2,
where simple explanations suggest no dependene of v over T .
The rst eet an nd a qualitative explanation through analogy with sim-
plied, small size fully onneted model. Then the nite size of neighbourhood
hanges the ondition for the misbehaviour to be advantageous from T > P to:
Ti > P

1−∏
j 6=i
(1 − vj)

 ≃ P (1− (1 − v)NN ) (8)
with v being the average vengefulness. The expression P
(
1− (1 − v)NN
)
may
be dubbed the eetive deterrent, as it weights the penalty with probability of
being punished. For large number of neighbors NN the term (1− v)
NN
goes to
zero, and we reover the T > P ondition. For small NN the dierene is visible
as the shift of the step in b(T ) funtion.
1.3 Simulations with group enforement
The previous setions have disussed the extreme opposite to Axelrod's assump-
tion of additive punishment  only a single agent was exeuting the punishment,
and it was assumed that this single agent had enough power to eet the pun-
ishment on anyone it had links with. Within this model a single enforer or
meta-enforer ould `polie' the whole neighbourhood.
It is interesting to see if the results obtained in previous simulations would
be hanged when one would require some greater number of agents, ating in
unison, to eet a punishment or meta-punishment. Suh situation of `group
ation', or oalition forming against a trespasser seems more similar to `real life'.
Lets assume that the punishment would take plae if at least kP neighbors
of trespassing agent i would be willing to enfore the norm. Similarly, meta-
punishment would require kMP neighbors to at together. In our alulations
we would limit ourselves to low values of kP and kMP of 2 and 3.
To obtain the expressions for group punishment model one starts with Φm(i)
and Ψm(i) dened as: probability that exatly m neighbors if agent i would be
willing to enfore the norm (or meta-norm) on i. We have:
Φ0(i) =
∏
j 6=i
(1− vj) (9)
Φ1(i) =
∑
k 6=i
∏
j 6=i,k
vk(1 − vj) (10)
Φ2(i) =
∑
k 6=i
∑
l>k,l 6=i
vkvl
∏
j 6=i,k,l
(1 − vj) (11)
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Φ3(i) =
∑
k 6=i
∑
l>k,l 6=i
∑
m>l,m 6=i
vkvlvm
∏
j 6=i,k,l,m
(1 − vj) (12)
Ψ0(i) =
∏
j 6=i
(
1− v′j(1 − vi)
)
(13)
Ψ1(i) =
∑
k 6=i
v′k(1− vi)
∏
j 6=i,k
(
1− v′j(1− vi)
)
(14)
Ψ2(i) =
∑
k 6=i
∑
l>k,l 6=i
v′kv
′
l(1− vi)
2
∏
j 6=i,k,l
(
1− v′j(1− vi)
)
(15)
Ψ3(i) =
∑
k 6=i
∑
l>k,l 6=i
∑
m>l,m 6=i
v′kv
′
lv
′
m(1− vi)
3
∏
j 6=i,k,l,m
(
1− v′j(1− vi)
)
(16)
Thus, requiring that more than kP agents (who are neighbors) deide group
together and punish transgressor i (or respetively kMP agents group to meta-
punish i) we have the expression for punishment (meta-punishment)
pikPP (i) =
(
1−
kP∑
k=0
Φk(i)
)
biP (17)
pikPMP (i) =
(
1−
kMP∑
k=0
Ψk(i)
)
P ′ (18)
Obviously, for kP = 0 and kMP = 0 (whih orresponds to just one agent being
able to eet punishment) the above expressions redue to Equations 3, 6.
Figure 3 ompares results for SW network at low lling fator φ = 0.005,
where the problems related to the need to nd enough enforers for the group
ation should be most visible, for three values of kP = 1, 2, 3 (top, middle and
bottom row respetively). The shift of high b regime to regions of T/P < 1 is
even more pronouned than in Figure 2, the reason being lear: it is inreasingly
more diult to nd two and three agents ating in unison in neighborhoods
of average size of 5. However, there is no radial hange in behaviour of the
system as the whole.
2 To enfore or to break the norm?
In Axelrod's study as well as in the results presented above, boldness and venge-
fulness were treated as separate harateristis of an agent. Details of our sim-
ulations show that in most ases the best payos are ahieved by agents who
at the same time take advantage from breaking the norm and atively pursue
enforement on other trespassers, that is agents with simultaneously high b and
v. while perfetly aeptable from mathematial point of view, this is somewhat
against psyhologial expetations: one an either be a polieman or a thief. We
dub this ase the exlusive model.
To see if suh ontradition of hoies has inuene on the simulated soieties
we have performed series of runs in whih bi and vi were oupled through vi =
1 − bi, that is, the more the agent ated as trespasser (higher bi) the smaller
was his vengefulness. This simple relation does not reet the omplexity of the
issue of the exlusivity of hoies, but allows an insight into possible outomes.
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The simulations returned quite interesting results, as presented in Figure 4
for SW network at two lling fators (φ = 0.005 and φ = 0.02), with single
agent enforement. For small T/P stable result was b = 0 and v = 1. For
large T/P the opposite result was true. The width of the transition region
depends on the lling fator, for larger number of neighbors the region was
muh narrower. The hange in the value of the of E resulted in almost diret
shift of the of the step-like inrease of b as funtion of T toward lower T . The
onset of the norm-breaking behaviour was given by simple relation T0 = P −E.
This orresponds to ondition when the benet of norm breaking (T ) exeeds
the optimum benets of the enforers (P − E).
The exlusive bv model ould be enhaned in a way that instead of using
relation b = 1 − v (whih allows an agent to at `a bit as a polieman and a
bit as a thief') one would use more ompliated rule. This may be subjet of
separate investigation.
3 Norm enforement through bounty hunting
Within Axelrod's model vengefulness and meta-vengefulness were diretly ou-
pled. In our extension of the approah desribed above we have deoupled them,
and studied inuene of the meta-enforement of the norm persistene. There
is, however another interesting possibility, whih is based on simplied observa-
tions of `real life' situations, where norm enforement, although in itself ostly
(through onstant wathfulness ost E), may be positively reinfored, without
resorting to meta-norms.
The mehanism is quite simple. Suppose the trespasser is aught. Then the
agent or agents who have aught him would get a bounty B. The bounty may
be set arbitrarily, but in out simulations we use the following senario. The
eetive penalty pikPP (j) may be treated as a ne imposed on the trespasser j.
Part of it aounts for general osts, but the rest, desribed through fration
f , is divided among all agents that have partiipated in the at of enforement
on the trespasser (or, to formulate it within the model used here, among all
agents that might have partiipated in the at of enforement). This allows for a
strategy using bounty hunting as means of inreasing the payo of an agent,
and thus inreases v, whih might help in keeping b down.
Suppose we want to establish the payo for agent i for athing a trespassing
agent j. The whole bounty fpikPP (j) has to be divided among all agents k that
are neighbors of j, in a way that relates to their ability and willingness to enfore
the norm. We introdue a simple (though arbitrary) formula that preserves the
relation of the individual bounties B(i, j) to the vengefulness eort. First we
introdue the summed vengefulness around agent j:
vSj =
(neighbors of j)∑
k
vk, (19)
where summation goes over all neighbors of j. Using this it is easy to divide
the bounty: the bounty for agent i for athing trespasser j (who's willingness
to break the norm is given by boldness bj) is
B(i, j) = fpikPP (j)vi/v
S
j . (20)
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Thus the total bounty payo for agent i is given by:
B(i) =
∑
j
B(i, j) = fPvi
(neighbors of i)∑
j
bj
∑kP
n=0 (1− Φn(j))∑(neighbors of j)
k vk
(21)
For large number of enforers with high vengefulness, the bounty would be
divided among many agents, and thus relatively small. But suppose there is
just a few enforers  they would get signiant advantage for athing the
trespassers. The model has, in plae of P ′ and E′ only a single parameter f ,
desribing how muh of the penalty P is divided among the vengeful agents.
The new formula for payos replaes the meta-enforement terms with the
bounty term. The simulation spae is now simpler (two-dimensional, with vari-
ables b and v). Example of simulation results is presented in Figure 5. Left
olumn shows average b and v values as funtions of T/P , right olumn shows
results for the exlusive model disussed in previous setion.
Rows orrespond to inreasing frations of the penalty divided as bounty
among enforers, from f = 0.01, through f = 0.05 and f = 0.4 to f = 1. It is
worth noting that as eah agent has on average 5 neighbors, these frations allow,
in priniple to get quite signiant payo from bounty. With our simulation we
have set the enforement ost at E = 2 and penalty P = 20. Thus the bounty
from 5 trespassers at f = 0.05 might reah 5, overoming the ost of being
vengeful.
As a result in the model with independent b and v only for very low f we
observe behaviour resembling the one found in MNG simulations. For larger f
both b and v inrease simultaneously, in a smooth way. These results form the
best illustration of the statement that it pays best to be a thief and poliemen
at the same time.
For the exlusive ase the growth of b is quite similar, with v mirroring it
aording to ondition v = 1 − b. The onset of the inrease of b as funtion of
T/P takes plae at almost the same values for both the normal and exlusive
models
4 Conlusions
The onlusions of our models and simulations may be summarized as follows:
• deoupling norm enforement and meta-norm enforement (v and v′), set
as equal in the original model of Axelrod, has shown that the quantities
evolve in very dierent ways, thus the original assumption was probably
introduing artiial eets into results presented in [1, 2℄;
• for large (more than 20 agents), fully onneted soieties, boldness and
vengefulness followed simple rules, diretly relating them to net payos
for trespassers and enforers (T > P , P ′ > E);
• loally networked soieties show ompliated interplay of various param-
eters, with the leading role of the T/P and E/P ′ ratios and strong de-
pendene on the lling fator (number of neighbours). No disernible
dierenes were observed for dierent network topologies;
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• in all ases we have observed loal `pokets' of norm breakers (high b
agents) well below the limit of T/P = 1;
• a variant of the model, aimed at repliating the dihotomy of hoie norm
breaking/norm enforement, in the simplest form of setting v = 1 − b
leads to a smoothed step like behaviour of b, with the position of the step
deided by T vs P − E, and its width by the number of neighbours;
• a new model, Bounty Norms Game (BNG), alternative to Meta Norms
Game, based on the division of part of the penalty among norm enforers
has been presented. Despite totally dierent nature of the proess govern-
ing the evolutionary benets of enforement the results resemble in general
way results from MNG simulations. Simpliity and `real life' bakground
of BNG make it a good andidate for at least some of the norm enfore-
ment studies.
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Figure 1: Comparison of nal values of average b, v and v′ as funtions of the
ratio of treasure to penalty (T/P ) for dierent network topologies. Top row:
SW network, middle row: NN network, bottom row: RAND network. Left
olumn: E/P ′ = 2/3, right olumn E/P ′ = 5/3. Red irles  b, green triangles
 v, blue squares  v′. Filling fator φ = 0.005.
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Figure 2: Comparison of nal values of average b, v and v′ as funtions of the
ratio of treasure to penalty (T/P ) for dierent lling fators in the ase of SW
network. Top row: φ = 0.005, middle row: φ = 0.01, bottom row: φ = 0.02.
Left olumn: E/P ′ = 2/3, right olumn E/P ′ = 5/3. Red irles  b, green
triangles  v, blue squares  v′.
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Figure 3: Comparison of nal values of average b, v and v′ as funtions of
the ratio of treasure to penalty (T/P ) for dierent sizes of the group needed to
enfore the norm, in the ase of SW network and φ = 0.005. Top row: one agent,
middle row: two agents, bottom row: three agents. Left olumn: E/P ′ = 2/3,
right olumn E/P ′ = 5/3. Red irles  b, green triangles  v, blue squares 
v′.
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Figure 4: Comparison of nal values of average b, v and v′ for the exlusive bv
model, in the ase of SW network. Top row: φ = 0.005, bottom row: φ = 0.02.
Left olumn: E/P ′ = 2/3, right olumn E/P ′ = 5/3. Red irles  b, green
triangles  v, blue squares  v′.
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Figure 5: Comparison of nal values of average b, v and v′ as funtions of the
ratio of treasure to penalty (T/P ) for the bounty hunting model. Top row:
f = 0.01, seond row: f = 0.05, third row: f = 0.4, bottom row: f = 1. Left
olumn: model with independent b and v; right olumn: model with exlusive
b and v (v = 1− b). Red irles  b, green triangles  v.
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